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Brownfield revitalization offers great opportunities
for structural economic change, but in most cases
redevelopment does not take place spontaneously.
The main reasons for reluctance to redevelop
brownfield sites are:
a. the possible risks brownfields entail, and
b. the lack of knowledge concerning the way these
risks (and the redevelopment at large) could can be
handled financially.
This guide deals with seven sections.
Section 1 the overview
Section 2 the benefits and costs involved in brownfield redevelopment
Section 3 analyses the difficulties (or market failures) involved in tapping
into the major economic potential that brownfields represent.
Section 4 discusses four models of public-private cooperation in
brownfield regeneration.
Section 5 first deals with some specific (financial) incentives to tip the
balance in favour of brownfield redevelopment. These incentives can be
used separately, but may also be part of more complicated financial
arrangements, that are discussed in this section as well.
Section 6 discusses opportunities and obstacles in EU legislation and
regulations pertinent to financing brownfield redevelopment.
To conclude, section 7 offers a checklist that can be used in decision-
making on brownfield redevelopment. Where possible, the checklist refers
to the previous pages/sections of the guide.
Introduction
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Following Alker & Joy (2000) a brownfield site can be
defined as any land or premises which has previously
been used or developed and is not currently fully in
use (it is partially occupied or utilised, or vacant or
derelict). The previous use may have resulted in
contamination of the site; or there are real or
perceived contamination problems. Therefore a
brownfield site is not available for immediate beneficial use without
intervention. Such beneficial use could involve any, or a combination, of the
following options.
Costs
Brownfield redevelopment first involves all the usual costs relating to site
(re-)development, but it faces special costs due to early-stage site
assessment of contamination, remediation planning and direct costs of
remediation (Bartsch & Wells, 2003). 
An important characteristic of brownfield reclamation in that respect is
that the reclamation costs are linked to the actual end use of the site. For
example, recreational land use generally requires a different level of
cleanness than industrial land use. Another characteristic is that
reclamation costs are often hard to predict, as the actual state and
location of contamination manifests itself only during the clearing-up
process. These two characteristics taken together make it important to be
flexible about the end use of the site and the exact arrangement of
buildings and facilities, throughout the whole redevelopment process.
Making (minor) changes to the site plan may result in much more cost-
efficient reclamation.
In addition to these special costs, brownfield redevelopment involves typical
financing costs because of the higher perceived risk associated with the
project.
Another feature of brownfield sites is that they are often situated in
developed urban areas. Compared to greenfield development, brownfield
redevelopment can impose considerable externalities on neighbouring
people and businesses, over a substantial period of time.
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Benefits
A distinction must be made here between:
■ economic and social benefits for society at large; and
■ financial benefits for specific economic actors, i.e. commercial benefits
for private parties and fiscal benefits for governments.
The occurrence of these benefits and their possible magnitude will depend
on the exact type of redevelopment (residential, industrial, etc) and on the
base-line used (greenfield development as base-line, or no development as
base-line)
Economic and social benefits (including environmental benefits)
Potential economic and social benefits from brownfield revitalization are
numerous and include (De Sousa, 2000; NRTEE, 2003; RESCUE, 2005)
■ protection of public health & safety, including protection of groundwater
and soil;
■ reduction of development pressure on greenfield sites (reduced urban
sprawl);
■ reduction in externalities from transportation (air pollution, congestion
etc) due to reduction in commuter travel;
■ maintenance of existing jobs and creation of new ones. This includes the
direct and indirect safeguarding and/or creation of jobs by the
remediation process itself (with a relatively high regional multiplier
effect of the investment), the direct safeguarding  and/or creation of
jobs by the settlement of companies on the redeveloped site, the
indirect safeguarding and/or creation of jobs by multiplier effects of
these new settlements, and the indirect safeguarding and/or creation
of jobs by increasing the attractiveness of the urban quarter involved;
■ renewal of urban cores, elimination of socio-economic stigmas
associated with living in the proximity of brownfield sites, access to
affordable housing.
Fully exploiting the potential of particular brownfield sites for urban and
regional economic development requires considerable fine-tuning of the
specific brownfield based spatial development to the urban and/or regional
economic strategy (RESCUE, 2005: 46-47). The latter analyses the
competitiveness of regional economies and of regional location factors,
identifies promising economic clusters, centres of excellence and growth,
and derives strategic targets, instruments and initiatives for structural
policy and economic promotion. Growth sectors are then assigned to main
development areas, giving a special focus on internal spatial development
i.e. on brownfield sites.
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Commercial benefits
The main motivating factor for private stakeholders to get involved in
brownfield redevelopment, is the profit that can be made by developing the
site into an exploitable and marketable object or by directly selling the
property after remediation. In other words the main commercial benefits
are:
■ cash-flow from economic objects (housing, offices, recreational
facilities) on the redeveloped site (operating profits); and/or
■ yield from selling off redeveloped property.
In some cases an additional motive is to divest liability risks/costs 
(De Sousa, 2000:839).
Although often it will be the private sector that reaps commercial benefits,
such benefits can also be attained by the public sector if it is involved in
property selling and/or economic exploitation after redevelopment.
Public fiscal benefits
In addition to possible commercial benefits for government, some of the
benefits of brownfield redevelopment translate directly into positive
financial effects for government:
■ restoration and/or enhancement of the tax base of vacant and
underutilized sites (increase in revenue from property tax, income taxes)
■ increased utilization of existing hard (infrastructure) and soft public
services (efficiency gains due to better dispersion of fixed costs,
increase in revenue from user charges)
■ revenue from development charges.
Table 1 gives an overview of the different types of benefits and costs.
Table 1: Private, fiscal and social costs & benefits
Financial, private
I
Operating profits and/or yield
from selling property +
IV
Redevelopment and
remediation costs (borne by
private sector) +
Public, fiscal
II
Operating profits and/or yield
from selling property + fiscal
benefits +
V
Redevelopment and
remediation costs (borne by
public sector) +
Social
III
Positive externalities of
redevelopment
VI
Negative externalities of
redevelopment (esp. on
neighbouring people and
businesses)
= TOTAL BENEFITS 
(I+II+III)
= TOTAL BENEFITS 
(IV+V+VI)
Demolition - Stuttgart
Flood defences - Medway
A new vision with water-Medway
There is no such thing as a typical brownfield site.
Brownfields are inherently varied in character, in
terms of (CABERNET, 2005):
■ location (which influences pressures for
redevelopment, spatial design constraints, property
market values etc);
■ physical condition (derelict buildings, protected
historic buildings, contamination, ground stability
etc);
■ other factors, such as accessibility of the site,
fragmentation of the site etc.
Generally, if (financial) private benefits exceed costs (and profits are to be
made), redevelopment will be unproblematic from the financial perspective.
These are the type of projects that have been labelled self-developing
sites (Börner, Paternoga & Ferber, 2000). These are sites with high
property value and low reclamation costs that have their own dynamic
development potential. In most cases the redevelopment implies an
increase of the value of the site and there is no need for specific (public
sector) intervention. These projects are largely, private-driven. These sites
are the A-category in the ABC model used within the CABERNET network,
and are the top tier in the three-tier model used in the Canadian NRTEE
framework (NRTEE, 2003: 5-6). 
It is important to stress that (even a high level of) contamination as such
does not stand in the way of involvement of private developers (De Sousa,
2000:840; Dixon, Pocock & Waters, 2005: 81). It is the balance of (expected)
costs and (expected) benefits that is decisive. In table 1 these are sites
where the benefits in cell I easily outweigh the costs in cell IV. As there will
not be much reason for government involvement the redevelopment and
remediation cost share of government in cell V can be kept low. Fiscal
benefits (part of cell II) as a result of private redevelopment will often be
treated as windfall revenues for government. The commercial profits made
by the private sector and the fiscal benefits may be used to mitigate the
external costs for neighbouring people and businesses (cell VI), requiring a
certain intervention from government, even if the project as such is
private-driven.
Sites with a specific development potential but with significant risks of
development (regarding remediation costs and after-reclamation value),
can be labelled the B-category or middle tier of passive-developing sites or
potential development sites. The market value - after being cleaned up -
may be slightly above or slightly below the combined cost of clean-up and
development. Special policy concepts in the shape of public-private
partnerships are needed here for redevelopment to take place, aimed at
risk sharing and coordinated planning and financing. Policy initiatives must
be aimed at raising anticipated end-use values, reducing anticipated costs,
or a combination of the two.
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Category B is obviously the most intriguing and complicated type of
brownfield site. Is it possible for the public sector to significantly reduce
financial costs for private parties (cell IV) and/or increase private benefits
(cell I)? What is the effect of such intervention in terms of fiscal costs and
benefits (cells V and II)? Does redevelopment now turn out to be positive,
for all parties concerned? In essence, public intervention in the case of
these sites is about juggling with various opportunities for cooperation in
redevelopment and about financial cross-fertilization.
Lastly, there are non-developing or reserve sites. These are sites without
development potential at least during the foreseeable future: the C-
category or bottom tier of sites. Some of these sites require (public-
driven) reclamation and interim management for ecological, environmental
or safety reasons. This is about tackling the main opportunity costs of
non-redevelopment by a minimum amount of remediation (cell III, partly <>
costs in cell V).
This distinction between these three different types of brownfield sites is
depicted in the two figures below.
Figure 1: ABC model of sites, land value after reclamation in relation to
reclamation costs
Figure 2: Viability of brownfield sites
Market
Failures in
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The ‘site abnormals’ that figure 2 relates to are mainly concerned with the
basic problem mentioned earlier: high remediation costs which may also be
hard to estimate.
The ‘loss’ depicted for category C could also be labelled the non-profitable
budget top.
As a reference value to categorise sites, in figure 2 the value of hard end-
use is depicted, i.e. the value of commercial and industrial land use after
remediation. If there is soft end-use (like social housing), the dotted-line in
figure 2 will drop and sites will move from the A-category to the B-
category, respectively from the B- to the C-category. As was mentioned
earlier, one of the problems in brownfield development is that end-use and
remediation are intertwined. Decisions on end-use influence decisions on
the remediation necessary, and vice versa. Remediation costs and end-use
value are then also related. During redevelopment (especially during the
first stages) a site that may initially be labelled a B-category site, may turn
out to be an A-site or a C-site.
This mechanism stresses the importance of involvement of all stakeholders
from stage one. If a site is remediated first by government with public
funds and then offered to private investors for redevelopment according
to predetermined and detailed land-use schemes, opportunities will be
missed to adjust plans to insights and wishes of investors. If all parties are
involved the difference (‘profit’) between end-use value and remediation
costs can be maximised.
In the remainder of this guide the focus will be on category B: sites that
have potential but do not develop when left to the private sector, due to
market failures. Market failures cause private developers to exclude social
and environmental benefits, to undervalue commercial benefits and to
overvalue costs, thereby restricting brownfield redevelopment (NRTEE,
2003: A-29 ff). In essence, two market failures dominate: externalities and
uncertainty & risk.
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Market failure 1: Externalities
Developers tend to have a narrow perception of the benefits of brownfield
redevelopment as they focus solely on their own financial interests (cells I
and IV). Private markets fail to capture collective benefits such as
environmental benefits, improved neighbourhoods, preserved wetlands and
greenfields, and public health impacts (cell III). Moreover, on the societal
level, increased brownfield remediation will eventually result in cheaper
remediation (as volume increases, economies of scale will occur due to
specialisation), but it is not likely that individual developers will be
interested in contributing to that (long-term) effect.
Redevelopment may also generate benefits for other private sector parties.
First, brownfield redevelopment increases the ability of other firms to produce
wealth. These third-party wealth and income impacts sometimes result in
increased property values of neighbouring commercial and residential property,
and in increased value of neighbouring brownfield sites. Secondly, brownfield
redevelopment has a cost-saving effect for third parties in terms of more
efficient use of existing infrastructure, transportation and municipal services.
As long as these positive impacts on third parties and on society at large
are not (partly) passed on to the parties bearing the development costs (i.e.
are not fully internalised), a less than optimal amount of redevelopment will
take place. Put differently: equitable cost- and profit-sharing
arrangements among all stakeholders, including internalization of
externalities are essential to redevelopment of B-sites. In terms of table 1:
■ cells I, II, IV and V should be taken into account as a whole, and costs and
benefits may be shifted from one cell to another in order to create a
situation in which both public sector and private sector parties gain. For
example, if we have a marginal site, and government is hardly involved in
the redevelopment of that site, but it will enjoy tax increases after
redevelopment, it can also bear part of the remediation costs, maybe
tipping the balance in the direction of redevelopment;
■ if it is necessary for redevelopment to take place, benefits and costs in
cells III and VI should be internalized. For example, if surrounding businesses
that are not involved in the redevelopment (and do not bear any costs) are
better off as a result of redevelopment, and they can be made to pay the
parties bearing the redevelopment costs (= internalization), such an
arrangement would not only be more equitable, but may also make the
difference between a site being redeveloped or not.
A prerequisite to making adequate cost- and profit-sharing arrangements
is that all parties involved should have a general overview of costs and
benefits, which is often problematic. This corresponds with the observation
made by the brownfield redevelopment working group in CLARINET that
redevelopment is composed of multiple cost elements, but that a general
overview of the costs is generally lacking. Public and private project
developers often cannot or do not provide transparent information about
property prices, treatment cost and benefits. Budgets and funding are
often restricted to individual parts of the project like decontamination,
demolition or equipment and not integrated into the whole process,
resulting in (partial) funding gaps and possibly in project failures.
Demolition Works
Creating a new vision - Nantes
A new use for the Foundaries - Nantes
Major works Capping Beam - Medway
Market failure 2: Inability to deal with uncertainty, risk & ignorance 
The second market-failure is that risk-averse developers may undervalue
their own commercial benefits and/or overvalue the costs of brownfield
redevelopment.
In the case of brownfield redevelopment, apart from the normal risks
associated with infrastructure projects (site risks, construction risks,
operating risks - see USDT, 2004: 61-62), risk is reinforced by two specific
issues:
a. uncertainty regarding the impact of actual and acceptable
contamination on redevelopment costs;
b. uncertainty regarding (future) liability issues, and their impact on future
land value.
As with externalities, all stakeholders involved in brownfield redevelopment
should sufficiently deal with risk, by means of equitable risk-sharing
arrangements, based on two essential ‘rules’:
a. Risk should be allocated to the party that is best able to manage it.
b. Taking risks should be rewarded.
From rule a) it follows, for example, that commercial risks should be
allocated to commercial parties, and political risks to government. From
rule b) it follows that risk-sharing arrangements have to be integrated into
the cost- and profit-sharing arrangements.
Regarding the use of public-private partnerships in
infrastructure projects it is common to distinguish
between four basic phases in the development of
these projects: Design (D), Finance (F), Build (B), and
Operate (O, or: Maintain, M). Between each of these
phases ownership can be transferred (T) from one
party to another. The actual arrangement can then be
denoted by the phases for which the private party is responsible, and the
moment transfer of ownership takes place. Some examples are:
■ DFBT: the private sector takes care of the full development of the
infrastructure which is then transferred to the public sector (turnkey
project);
■ BOT: the private sector builds the infrastructure (designed and financed
by the public sector), operates the infrastructure for a certain amount
of time, after which the infrastructure is handed over to the public
sector;
■ F: private financing only (like the UK PFI projects).
If the private sector is involved in the operation of the infrastructure,
often a system of concessions is used which makes it possible to allow
private parties to compete from time to time. Concession fees (paid by
government to the concessionaire) can be based on the availability and/or
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actual use of the infrastructure during the concession period (availability
fee, user fee or mixed fee). In some cases of private financing (PFI) the
actual use of infrastructure is used to (partly) to determine the level of
return payments made by government, putting part of the long-term
project risk with the private financier.
A similar distinction between the different phases can be made in the case
of brownfields, (see table 2 - partly based on Deloitte, 2005). As was put
forward before, ideally the activities in phases P, F, SD and RD should
constitute an iterative process.
Different forms of cooperation between the public and the private sector
can now be distinguished.
Firstly, there is private development. The private sector is in charge of the
process throughout all stages, but assistance may be offered by
government during the planning and financing stages. For B-sites such
assistance is vitally important.
Secondly, there is (traditional) public development, in which private parties
act only as buyer of redeveloped sites. The initiative to redevelop is taken
by government, who plans, finances, takes care of remediation, and builds.
Moreover, government remains firmly in charge of the operation of public
facilities on the site.
Thirdly, there is procurement & concession. This development is publicly
driven, but there is significant involvement of the private sector in the
project by means of procurement of at least one of the phases of the
redevelopment. Private involvement can extend over almost all phases of
the process, from design to building and/or operation. In the latter case a
concession system can be used that can be based on the life cycle of the
project (15-25 years). If all phases are incorporated the arrangements are
called integrated contracts.
Finally, there are alliances. With procurement & concession, private sector
involvement can be major, but private parties still act as contractors. With
alliances, there is equivalence between the parties involved. 
The difference between the Procurement & Concession model and the
Alliance model corresponds to the two main types of public-private
partnership (PPP) the European Commission has labeled purely contractual
PPPs and institutionalised PPPs respectively. 
Models of
Public-Private
Cooperation in
Brownfield
Redevelopment
InitiativeI
P Planning (including site assessment, initial design)
Financing of redevelopmentF
SD Site Development (clean-up, remediation)
Real estate Development (building)RD
Oc Operation & maintenance of commercial end-use facilities
Operation & maintenence of facilities in public domain (like public infrastructure)Op
Investment needed. Anchor Pile Cap 
Furrell’s Creek Medway
A new vision - Hengelo
The main differences and similarities between these four models are
represented in table 3.
Table 3: Four models of cooperation
These four models are of course archetypical. In practice, features of two
or more models may be combined, as the examples of the REVIT
participants clearly show. For instance, within a public development the
planning and financing may be a cooperation between the private and
public sector, with the site development being taken care of by
government, and building activities being procured to private parties.
Alternatively, within a coalition model, site development may be procured to
a specialized remediation contractor. A further complication is that in
some cases a semi-public (or public-private) body is in overall charge of the
redevelopment. On the whole, in all REVIT projects, as in most brownfield
redevelopment projects, elements of the PPP Alliance model are clearly
present.
Ten critical success factors for Procurement & Concession PPP (DFBM)
and PPP Alliance project structures
Practical experience with PPP models (especially Procurement &
Concession PPP, and PPP Alliance) for infrastructure and local
(re)development projects in a number of EU countries, notably the
Netherlands, has resulted in a number of do-s and don’t-s. The ten critical
success factors for PPP presented below are partly based on NABU &
Norton Rose (2004), and have been adapted and rephrased where
necessary, including insights from Ernst & Young Consulting (2000),
Nijkamp, Rodenburg & Wagtendonk (2002), and Lange & McNeill (2004b).
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Critical Success Factor 1 – All parties involved should have a clear idea of
their own objectives and constraints regarding the project. They should
know what they want, what they can do and what they cannot do.
Critical Success Factor 2 – When choosing a PPP structure for a
particular project, it is necessary to have acquired a sufficient degree of
insight into the (reasonable) expectations surrounding to what extent the
private-public cooperation can add value, in relation to other, more
traditional contract forms (private development, public development).
Critical Success Factor 3 – The public authorities that are involved in the
preparation, procurement (tender) and/or execution of a project should,
before procuring (parts of) the project, have formed a ‘public consortium’
which includes proper agreements as to project organisation, authority,
mandates, delegation, financing and the required authorisation, zoning and
planning, in order to prevent discords between different public bodies in
later project phases. They should ‘get their act together’ beforehand.
Critical Success Factor 4 – The earlier the private sector is involved in the
preparation of a particular project, the greater the chance for success. 
Critical Success Factor 5 – Selection of private parties should be based
on competition as much as possible. A diligently executed market
consultation increases the chances of success for a project. The overall
number of parties involved should be minimised. Involvement of parties can
be limited to certain phases of the project-chain on a ‘need-to-participate’
basis.
Critical Success Factor 6 – Involvement of neighbouring citizens and
businesses is important, but ask for specific arrangements rather than
making them ‘part of the consortium’.
Critical Success Factor 7 – When selecting the most suitable PPP parties,
it is more important to focus on their ability to manage the disciplines
required for that project than the ability to execute the various tasks
themselves. A PPP contractor should be selected on its ability to manage
the process and the inherent risks.
Critical Success Factor 8 – For success of PPP projects the involvement
of institutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) is a must. The
initiative and planning phases should provide sufficient time and
opportunity to involve such institutions.
Critical Success Factor 9 - The scope of a PPP-project should be of
sufficiently relevant size to justify the upfront investments in terms of
transaction costs. The scope should be sufficient for such projects to be
managed effectively.
Critical Success Factor 10 – The composition of and the culture within the
teams involved in a project are crucial factors for the successful
completion of that project.
Stage/model I. Private development II. Public development III. Procurement &
concession PPP
IV. PPP Alliance
Initiative Private Public Public Priate, public
Planning Private, with public
assistance
Public Possibly private Priate, public
Financing Private, with public
financial assistance
Public Possibly private Priate, public
Site development Private Public Possibly private Priate, public
Building Private Public Possibly private Priate, public
Operating &maintenance
(commercial facilities
Private Private, public Possibly private Priate, public
Maintenance of public
facilities
Public Public Public Priate, public
Partnership Working
Changes in Rochester Riverside - Medway
Bringing people into the plans - Hengelo
Financial incentives (A.-G.)
Before going into some more complicated cost-, profit-
and risk-sharing arrangements that may be used in
public-private partnerships dealing with brownfield
redevelopment, some specific financial incentives are
discussed in this section. Such incentives may be part
of more complicated arrangements, but could also be used separately, to tip
the balance in favour of brownfield redevelopment.
All of these incentives are what CABERNET calls market enhancements
(CABERNET, 2005: 5ff) rather than market replacements. Market
enhancements involve public agencies improving the working of the market
by sharing, or modifying, the costs and/or risks faced by the private sector
or by taking steps to enhance the market values likely to be achieved.
Generally, such incentives are financial mechanisms that motivate, underpin
or compel sustainable practices, and/or inhibit, restrain or eliminate
unsustainable practices in redevelopment (RESCUE, 2005: 111). As policy
tools such incentives should be applied uniformly (create a level playing field,
avoid distortion of competition), should be reliable in terms of their capacity
to deliver (effective, sufficient to facilitate achievement of the objectives
they are designed to target) and should be easy to administer. An important
question here is whether or not instruments can be used on a discretionary
basis. Often instruments like subsidies and tax incentives do not only benefit
the target-group of marginally viable projects but also projects that do not
really need the incentives (A-sites/tier I sites). Discretionary use of specific
incentives (i.e. project-specific, on an as-needed basis) is more effective,
but involves much more administration. See NRTEE (2003: table A5-1) for an
assessment of the effectiveness of various instruments.
As yet, there are no best practice examples of such incentives in Europe
for sustainable brownfield regeneration (RESCUE, 2005: 124). The little
research that has been done on financial incentives for brownfield
redevelopment (Adams et al., 2000) shows that plugging the financial gap
and aiding cash-flow, by means of subsidies and tax relief, can be effective.
Generally, carrots are deemed to be more effective than sticks. Research
carried out in the US (Alberini et al., 2005) suggests that direct financial
incentives (subsidies, tax credits) are especially relatively effective in the
case of developers that have prior experience with brownfield development.
Liability relief is favoured by inexperienced developers.
Moreover, it has been shown (Lange & McNeil, 2004a) that financial
incentives should not (only) be directed at the environmental side of
brownfield redevelopment (cleaning up the site) but also at other factors
that are not specific to brownfield redevelopment and may well play an
important part, like land use possibilities, infrastructure close to the site,
and political support. This corresponds to the outcomes of research done
by Nijkamp et al. (2002), who show that procedural factors are just as
often the cause of stagnation in brownfield redevelopment as finances,
with ownership issues being the third important factor.
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A. Cash grants
Cash grants can be used to deal with specific costs, like in the case of
contamination assessment grants, remediation grants, grants for project
support etc.
Cash grants can also be used for ‘gap funding’. Such grant aid addresses
the private sector cost-value gap. Gap funding has the advantage that only
those projects that can demonstrate a need for assistance to become
commercially viable actually receive assistance; those that are already
viable do not. Case-by-case economic appraisals of the direct and indirect
effects of the proposed project seeking grant aid can be used to
determine the maximum level of grant commensurate with public benefit,
or to minimise any displacement effects
B. Loans 
Providing capital on less than commercial terms (‘soft’ loans) is another
way of reducing the funding gap. The advantages of such loans over
commercial loans could involve interest rates, pay-back period and pay-
back conditions, including the use of forgivable loans (capital grants or
grants à fonds perdu).
C. Tax incentives
Tax incentives could help promote brownfield redevelopment by providing a
cash-flow cushion for developers, which makes the project numbers work.
Such tax incentives can take a number of forms: rate reductions, tax
exemptions, tax abatements, tax credits, grace periods and tax forgiveness.
As with subsidies, they can be directed at specific financial aspects of
redevelopment activities: assessment costs, clean-up costs, costs of
historical rehabilitation, loan costs, creation of funds for future liability,
development of low-income housing etc. An example of a tax incentive for
brownfield redevelopment is tax expensing of clean-up costs (i.e. enabling
taxpayers to deduct environmental clean-up costs in the year(s) of the
actual clean-up rather than capitalise them over time). Another example is
low-income housing tax credits, which has a positive impact on the
possibility to redevelop brownfield sites for residential purposes.
One of the problems with tax incentives is that brownfield redevelopment
is in the direct interest of local and regional authorities that often have a
relatively small amount of tax autonomy. Involvement of national
government is then required.
Tax incentives can also be used as a stick rather than a carrot, for example
by introducing a vacant land tax or a tax on the development of
greenfields. The revenue of these taxes can be earmarked for the use of
carrots. 
Financial
Incentives &
Financing
Techniques
Looking Ahead
Creating a new vision - Medway
Machine Shop Medway
New uses - Dockside Outlet Centre Medway
D. Risk insurance & relief
Increasingly private insurance companies offer insurance products for
brownfield redevelopment. These products include:
■ stop-loss-policy (for remediation phase). The insurance company pays
for on-site remediation costs overruns above and beyond a certain
threshold. This allows the party undertaking the remediation to cap or
fix the costs prior to remediation (clean-up cost-cap insurance);
■ post-remediation-policy (post-remediation phase). Coverage deals with
additional costs if further remediation must be performed (unknown
contamination and/or new conditions) and/or third party claims must be
honoured (tort claims). This can include off-site clean-up costs that
result from migrating pollution.
Market failure can result in the absence of these specific insurance
products as such, or in too high premiums and/or insufficient coverage,
due to the phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard. Government
can take two types of action:
■ regulating the insurance sector;
■ offering insurance itself.
Figure 3 shows a private brownfield redeveloper’s typical risk-handling structure.
Figure 3: Risk handling structure for remediation cost overruns and
unknown contamination
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Apart from securing or offering sufficient risk insurance, government can
try to smartly deal with risks issues in its capacity as project initiator or
regulator. One example is to issue sites in package deals to equalize
profitable and non-profitable sites. This could be a package of different
brownfield sites, but also a package of brownfield and greenfield sites. The
important thing is to combine two different risk profiles.
Another possibility is for government (or rather the project consortium at
large) to make sure that there is a sufficient general buffer available. A
general financial package deal, agreed in the initial stages of project
development, should include an agreed allowance for variations in cost
because of uncertainties at the outset (a ‘contingency sum’). This would
provide a long-term basis for planning the project and would ensure that
each phase of development will not be delayed by shortfalls in resources.
E. Liability relief
Liability issues are often subject to national legislation which varies across
EU countries. It is however possible through individual project agreements
for local governments to assume liability for future risks once given
remediation requirements are met, and provided that the end-use of the
site does not change, as unanticipated changes in end-use can result in
unacceptable exposure to contamination. Using the right institutional
controls (ranging from covenants to contracts to permits) to prevent such
changes is not only in the public interest but also clarifies liability. 
If future liability is taken over by government the outer part of the risk
structure in figure 3 would change from private insurance to public risk-
taking. This could however still involve recurrent premiums to be paid by
developers/owners or a lump-sum to be paid to government upon
assumption by government of liability.
F. Capital attraction incentives
Successful brownfield redevelopment involves recognition and relief of
private lender and developer financial concerns. Grants and tax incentives
will generally improve the financial standing of the project, improving loan
conditions. Liability relief measures can increase the value of the site as
collateral, especially if transfer of future liability to government does also
apply to lenders that have to take over brownfield sites after mortgage
defaults. Still, specific incentives to attract private capital may be needed.
A number of possibilities exist:
■ loan guarantees (ensuring a minimum return for the lender);
■ companion loans (showing that government is willing to take risk);
■ subordinated loan agreements by government;
■ subsidising interest payments;
■ offering assistance or information that provides comfort to investors/lenders,
and that can reduce underwriting and documentation costs;
Legal liability insurance to re-mediate unknown contamination 
and/or cover tort claims (including off-site contamination)
Cost cap insurance (stop-loss-policy) for cost overruns 
above threshold
Own buffer for cost overruns in remediation phase
Own funding for planned remediation 
costs of known contamination
Completed Retail Area - Medway
Large Spaces
New Uses
G. Planning & land assembly assistance
Various measures exist that can assist private brownfield redevelopers:
■ governments can take area-based initiatives (e.g. improving
infrastructure or changing the planning status of the sites);
■ governments may want to offer their expertise to private site
developers;
■ governments can get involved in land assembly and title clearance
activities (e.g. compulsory purchase of land from the existing owner) to
improve ownership status of the site (e.g. reducing ownership
fragmentation).
This list could be extended with other examples; the important thing here is
to be creative. Governments can take no-cost or low-cost initiatives that
can really make a difference.
Because of the great diversity in brownfield sites, there is no single ‘best’
local approach when it comes to applying the various financial incentives.
Every site will require its own mix-and-match approach to make the most
effective use of incentives, often involving a range of governments (EU,
central, regional, local) and private parties (developers, consultancies,
banks, housing associations etc). See Bartsch & Wells (2003, 2005) for
numerous examples of the mixed use of instruments in the US.
Financing techniques (AA.-EE.)
Below some more complicated financing techniques are discussed.
AA. Tax Increment Financing
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) has been used in the US for a variety of
economic revitalisation efforts (Bartsch & Wells, 2003: 29). 
TIF is built on the idea that a brownfield initiative will create new value and
that this future value can be leveraged to finance some of the activities
needed for redevelopment. Central to TIF is the anticipated growth in
taxes the completed project will generate. As a first step government
determines the property tax income from a TIF district (different taxes like
corporate taxes or sales taxes could also be used). As investment in the
TIF district increases and the tax base improves, tax revenues beyond the
original base level - the increment - can be linked to these investments.
This link can take any of the forms described above (cash grant, loan,
planning assistance etc).
Obviously, there is a lag between investment and tax increment. Subsidies,
tax incentives and soft loans result in higher expenditure and/or lower
revenue during redevelopment and higher tax revenue at a (much) later
stage. Typically, TIF uses a 10- to 25- year time span. The costs of pre-
financing can simply be borne by government, or can be by-passed by
means of using TIF bonds, that are issued by (municipal) governments who
use the tax increment to pay off the debt. These TIF bonds are issued for
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the specific purposes of the redevelopment: acquiring and preparing the
site, upgrading utilities, streets, or parking facilities, and carrying out other
necessary site improvements. Special purpose bonds such as TIF bonds can
be an ideal tool for brownfield projects, and can be combined with other
types of funding, such as grants or loans.
One of the main advantages of TIF is that all kinds of positive externalities
can be captured and internalized. Setting up and managing TIF can however
be complicated. It requires a high level of technical expertise. Moreover,
actual tax increments may fall short of expectations, if the redevelopment
project fails or its economic impact is less than expected.
TIF as it was described above, is project-specific, with the tax increment of
a specific redevelopment project being used to offset the project’s
investment. TIF can also be used as a revolving TIF, in which case the tax
increment caused by an earlier project is used for investment in new
projects
BB. Revolving Loan Fund
A Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) is a fund that is formed with initial seed
capital and then used to make ‘soft’ loans for brownfield clean-up. The
fund is replenished as loans are repaid, with the repayments that are
ploughed back into the fund being used to make new loans for clean-up.
Governments can jump start an RLF by providing the initial seed capital,
but large remediation contractors, private developers, and financial
institutions can also be involved as initial financiers.
CC. Benefit sharing & claw-back
If public funding is offered to brownfield redevelopment, it is possible to
impose claw-back provisions if actual costs are lower than expected, or if
values are higher. The idea here is to make sure, through subsidies or other
financial means, that private developers ‘get’ the benefits they need, but to
cream off ‘excess’ benefits. Benefit-sharing is often used with subsidies
but can also be used in the case of loans (with the level of repayments
being determined by the level of benefits).
Benefit-sharing requires that a basic variable is chosen which clearly
indicates the benefits the private developer has enjoyed due to the
redevelopment. Such a basic variable can be related to cash revenues, to
profits or to values (for instance, property value). Next, a benchmark
should be chosen: if the basic variable exceeds the benchmark, the claw-
back mechanism is invoked. Subsequently, benefit-sharing requires
agreement on the actual amount that will be transferred back to
government and the time horizon that is used.
Refurbishment
High Tech Units within Factories
A new begining - Torfaen
Anchor Buildings - Court of Justice - Nantes
DD. Development charges
Yet another way for the public sector to pick up the uplift in value due to
specific redevelopment activities is the use of development charges, of
which there are two main types (The Allen Consulting Group, 2003: 34):
■ Developer charge. Developers are asked to pay for their fair share of
facilities and services which will be beneficial to their project. This charge
is a ‘price’ paid by the developer based on the user-pays principle;
■ Cost impact mitigation payments. The developer is required to meet the
costs arising from the unanticipated demands of the development or to
compensate for the detrimental environmental effects of the project
(polluter-pays principle).
EE. Development gains taxes & Planning Gain Supplement
Development gains taxes are a mixture of Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
and development charges. They are similar to TIF in that they are based on
(expected) increases in property value. They have in common with developer
charges that they are linked to specific events in the development process,
for instance the granting of full planning permission. An example of a
development gains tax is the proposed UK Planning Gain Supplement (HM
Treasury, 2005).
As with most other instruments discussed in this section, with
development gains taxes it is possible to differentiate between rates used
for brownfield redevelopment and green development, to stimulate
brownfield redevelopment.
FF. Integrated contracts
If PPP Procurement & Concession is chosen as the development model, the
main financial instrument used will be contracting. If more than one stage
of the project-chain is put in the hands of the same contractor, these
contracts are called integrated contracts.
The important thing with PPP Procurement & Concession is to think of it in
terms of services rather than products. The service provider is supposed
to deliver a well-defined output over a relatively long period of time. The
service-provider takes a certain matter out of the hands of government.
For this it expects to be paid a ‘handling’ fee.
So far, experiences with DBFM contracts have largely been limited to
larger infrastructural projects. Within that context, basically, three types
of fee have been used (PPP Knowledge Centre, 2003: 7-8):
a. Availability fee. Most DBFM contracts involve a payment regime based on
availability and performance. If only part of the infrastructure is available
for use, the payment is reduced by an amount proportional to the non-
availability. In extreme cases this may mean that no payment is made at
all. Corrections for poor or substandard performance are often made by
means of a penalty points system. In extreme cases, substandard
performance may even lead to cancellation of the contract;
22 23
b. User/consumer fee. The most obvious example is the use of tolls. By
using tolls, the government can reduce the investment cost for the
project –provided that the volume risk can be predicted with a
reasonable degree of certainty. It is the degree to which the service-
provider can generate revenues from a concession that determines the
amount of additional government funding that is required to make the
project viable;
c. Mixed user fee. In the case of projects in which volume risks are a
factor it is possible to share these risks. In such cases a ‘shadow toll’
can be levied. This is a system in which the government pays the
service-provider a fee for every registered user of the infrastructure
concerned. This can be done by introducing a mechanism whereby the
risk of extremely low traffic volumes and the benefit of extremely high
traffic flows can be shared between the project consortium and the
government.
Translating these fees into integrated contracts for brownfield
redevelopment requires some creativity and examples from real life are yet
missing. However, there are some experiences with integrated services by
remediation contractors. The idea here is to let remediation be done by a
remediation contractor at a fixed clean-up price, with guaranteed full
indemnification for future liabilities, as remediation contractors are in the
position to optimally assess risks and can apply innovative remediation
methods.
Integrated contracts can be used to capture the uplift in economic values
after redevelopment by means of the concession mechanism, if operating
and maintenance contracts are to be newly procured or renegotiated after
a certain period of time. More generally, not selling land right out but
maintaining a ground rent (lease) based on a percentage of the let-able
rent achieved by the developer, can be a tool to capture the uplift in land
value after the initial phases of development.
Contracts
Working in Partnership - Tilburg
In general, EU environmental policies and legislation
have a significant impact on brownfield regeneration
(Leny, Nathanail & Thornton, 2005: 207), especially
through the following EU Thematic Strategies within
the Sixth Environmental Action Plan:
■ Strategy on Urban Environment (COM(2004)60 final), which directly
encourages brownfield regeneration;
■ Strategy on Soil Protection (COM(2003)179 final), which could promote
brownfield regeneration on sites where the soil is contaminated;
■ Strategy on Waste Prevention and Recycling (COM2003)301 final), to
which the Waste Framework Directive is central. This Directive (as it has
been amended from 1975 onwards) sets up a system for the
coordinated management of waste within the Union. Part of this system
is the Landfill Directive of 1999, which aims to prevent or reduce the
negative effects on the environment of waste being landfilled. The
Directive has led to the end of co-disposal of hazardous and municipal
waste and requires pre-treatment of waste prior to disposal in a landfill
(Leny, Nathanail & Thornton, 2005: 207). The readiness of the
development industry to tackle contaminated sites could be threatened
by the impact of the EU Landfill Directive (Dixon, Pocock & Waters, 2005:
79). The upside of the Landfill Directive is that – in the long run - it
works as a financial incentive for the sustainable re-use of soil, but in
the short term it increases redevelopment costs and could lower
property value (Heasman, 2005);
■ Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Resources (COM2003)572 final),
which has only an indirect effect.
In addition to the above, the EU is itself involved in urban regeneration
through its URBAN programme (a Community Initiative within the
Structural Policies). In the period 2000-2006 financial assistance was
offered to 70 area-based urban regeneration programmes throughout the
EU(-15). The main priorities for URBAN include the physical re-development
of brownfield sites.
State aid and regeneration guidelines were introduced by the Commission
in 1996. These guidelines identified deprived urban areas eligible for state
aid. However, in the past years, no Member State has made use of these
guidelines as they were apparently found to be too restrictive and
inflexible. The Commission therefore decided, in 2002, that they should not
apply in the future, and that the Commission will assess the issue on a
case-by-case basis, following the general state-aid rules. 
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These basic substantive rules on the control of state aid in the EU are set
out in Article 87 of the EC Treaty. This article provides that state aid is in
principle incompatible with the common market. Article 87(1) of the EC
Treaty can be broken down into four tests to establish if a measure within
an urban regeneration scheme constitutes state aid. A state aid will only
be present if all four tests are met:
a.  Is the measure granted by the state or through state resources?
b.  Does the measure favour certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods/services?
c.  Does the measure distort or have the potential to distort competition
by selectively favouring certain beneficiaries?
d.  Does the measure produce an effect on intra-Community trade?
The principle of incompatibility of state aid with the Treaty is not, however,
absolute.
Article 87(2) and Article 87(3) contain a number of exemptions under which
state aid shall or may be considered compatible by the Commission. In
exercising its discretionary powers for the application in particular of
Article 87(3) exemption, the Commission balances the importance and the
necessity of the aid measure in achieving a Community objective versus the
distortion of competition brought about by it.
In its Vademecum of March 2006 (European Commission, 2006) the
Commission has outlined the application of state aid provisions to
regeneration. This Vademecum results from a consultation procedure on
state aid in 2005, in which CABERNET participated (CABERNET, 2005).
According to CABERNET in principle EU competition policy has the
unintended effect of restricting the ability of member states to develop
meaningful cooperation between the public and private sector to facilitate
the regeneration of commercially non-viable sites. Such cooperation makes
use of market enhancements rather than market displacement. Pursuit of
market enhancements assists with the achievement, over time, of self-
sustaining market activity, thereby avoiding the need for continued public
sector interventions. Market displacement however involves public agencies
taking over responsibility for dealing with problematic brownfield land. Under
this scenario, the public sector acquires the problem site and takes full
responsibility for its reuse, meeting the costs of remediation, developing the
desired accommodation, letting to tenants and disposing of the
development to the private sector. So long as all transactions are
conducted at market value, no state aid is deemed to apply. But with market
displacement the loss of the public sector is probably greater than the
value of any grant made under a discretionary grant aid (or gap funding)
scheme, as all costs (and not just the excess costs) have to be addressed
by the public sector. The role of the private sector is reduced to that of a
contractor to the public sector rather than that of a risk-sharing partner,
resulting in insufficient exploitation of private sector expertise.
EU Legislation
& Financing
Brownfield
Redevelopment
Marketing
Cutting through the red tape
A strategy for development - Nantes
Creating new spaces - Hengelo
A similar counterproductive mechanism exists regarding the use of
discretionary versus non-discretionary (financial) incentives. Discretionary
measures attract Competition Policy attention but are more efficient than
tax incentives which cannot readily be restricted solely to aid commercially
non-viable projects. Discretionary measures involve greater financial
transparency, due to case-by-case appraisal, and demonstration of site-
specific non-viability. Unfortunately discretionary measures face increased
concerns over state aid.
All in all, CABERNET has argued that public-private partnerships that have
been designed to bridge the cost-value gap that often prevents the
commercial regeneration of many marginally non-viable brownfield sites
should be exempt (by means of a block exemption) from EU competition
policy. This position has not been endorsed by the Commission.
Table 4 summarises briefly (based on the 2006 Vademecum) which
regeneration measures do not involve state aid, which measures involve
compatible state aid, and how the Commission deals with public-private
partnerships for regeneration.  In most cases regeneration measures do
not involve state aid because they do not (have the potential to) distort
trade between member states. In cases where regeneration involves
compatible aid, member states have to show that the proposed measure is
well-designed, proportional, and well-targeted.
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Table 4: Regeneration measures and state aid
Regeneration measures which do not
involve state aid
Regeneration measures which involve
compatible state aid (Art. 87(c) and
(d) EC Treaty)
Use of PPPs in regeneration
Investment in infrastructure to
improve physical environment
In cases where polluter of brownfield
is not identified or cannot be made to
bear the cost of clean-up, application
of polluter-pays principle may be
replaced by subsidy scheme
The arrangements for financing the
PPP may or may not result in a
transfer of state aid to one or more
of the private partners. State aid
could be involved if there is over-
compensation of the costs of the
private partners (in which case the
first two columns apply)
Renewal or upgrading of residential
areas or properties
Coverage by aid of all additional
heritage-related costs in
regeneration projects 
For all types of PPPs, private
partners must be chosen in
accordance with EC rules on public
procurement, where these rules
apply. A properly conducted tender
procedure will provide reasonable
assurance that private partners will
be remunerated in line with market
conditions. In the absence of a tender
procedure, the Commission will look at
the detailed arrangements of the
PPP and the safeguards put in place
to avoid overcompensation in order to
determine if state aid is involved
Making investment in brownfield sites
more attractive than in greenfield sites
Training aid to promote social
integration and employment
The contractual arrangements between
the parties must be compatible with
Community anti-trust rules (i.e.
conditions in a PPP as regards the
prices to be charged to consumers)
Measures to promote education, to
assist families, to provide leisure, to
fight crime, etc
Aid to SMEs Specific rules will be developed in the
near future, differentiating between
purely contractual PPPs and
institutionalised PPPs (Procurement 
& Concession PPPs and PPP Alliances
respectively).
Measures to promote economic
activity in deprived local urban areas
Aid to larger companies if aid takes
place within assisted area (regional
aid map) and within limits
New Beginnings - Stuttgart
Making it happen - Stuttgart
PART 1: CHOICE OF DEVELOPMENT MODEL AND COOPERATION ISSUES
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PART 2: CHOICE OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES & FINANCING TECHNIQUES
Step Action Explanation
1 Identify all stakeholders Identify land ownership
Identify public authorities involved in redevelopment
2 Each stakeholder: Identify own
objectives and constraints
3 Create a public consortium
4 Identify costs and benefits of
redevelopment for the particular
project, for each stakeholder
As costs and benefits will vary with end-use, it may be sensible to use
2-3 different variants
No detailed costs/benefits estimates are necessary at this stage
5 Choose main development model Choice between: 
- Private development
- Public development
- PPP Procurement & Concessions
- PPP Alliance
Often the choice between public and private development is easy. Take
one of these models as starting point and ask whether PPP P&C or PPP
Alliance could add value
6 Specify party involvement for each
stage
For each stage of the project-chain, identify parties to be involved and
identify other stakeholders
Specify the type of involvement for each party (ally, possible
contractor, other interested party)
7 Specify involvement of expert
institutions
Like the EIB
8 Specify terms of reference for
contracting
Checklist
Step Action Explanation
9 Choose and specify main financial
instruments
A. Cash grants (specific <> gap funding)
B. Loans (and loan conditions)
C. Tax incentives
D. Risk insurance & relief
E. Liability relief
F. Capital attraction incentives
G. Planning & land assembly assistance
AA. Tax Increment Financing (TIF) 
BB. Revolving Loan Fund
CC. Benefit sharing & claw-back
DD. Development charges
EE. Development gains taxes
FF. Integrated contracts
10 Identify (detailed) costs/benefits for
all parties involved, including society
at large 
11 Check equity of resulting
cost/benefit sharing arrangement
12 Identify risks and the way they are
shared
13 Check adequacy and equity of risk-
sharing
14 Repeat steps 5, 6, and 9
Repeat steps 10-13
If outcome of steps 11 and/or 13 is not satisfying
15 Check compatibility with state aid
regulations
